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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates a recent phenomenon in the market for technology: online 
marketplaces for technological inventions, which support the listing, search, and exchange of 
technological inventions by sellers and buyers. Focusing on three salient theoretical factors 
that affect markets for technology – search costs, ambiguity about the underlying knowledge 
and its applications, and expropriation concerns – our research systematically explores which 
industries are served by online marketplaces. We exploit the fact that the magnitude of these 
factors varies across industries and identify key features of online marketplaces that may 
address these factors. Our proprietary dataset covers 12 online marketplaces for technology 
and spans over 140 industries. The results indicate that online marketplaces are more likely to 
serve an industry with (a) a higher cost of searching for technologies in that industry, (b) 
greater ambiguity about the underlying technology’s potential applications across industries, 
and (c) greater ability to protect inventions from expropriation. 
 
Keywords: Market for Technology, Online Markets, Search Costs, Ambiguity, 
Appropriation  
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1.  Introduction 
Markets for ideas and technologies have grown dramatically over recent decades and 
are receiving increasing attention from both scholars and practitioners (Agrawal, Cockburn, 
& Zhang, 2015b; Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001; Rivette & Kline, 2000). The result is 
a large body of work investigating a broad range of issues important for the market for 
technology. These issues include factors driving inventors’ participation in these markets 
(e.g., Bercovitz & Feldman, 2007; Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2013; Conti, Gambardella, & Novelli, 
2013; Fosfuri, 2006), the way in which the exchange is organized (e.g., Arora, Fosfuri, & 
Rønde, 2013; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Leone & Reichstein, 2012), and institutions supporting 
the market for technology (Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, 2003; Zhang & Li, 2010). 
In this paper, we study an institution that has emerged recently in the market for 
technology: online technology marketplaces. These marketplaces use information technology 
and the Internet to facilitate the listing, search, and exchange of inventions between inventors 
and technology owners or sellers on one hand and prospective licensees or technology buyers 
on the other (Bakos, 1997; Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2009; Dushnitsky & Klueter, 2011). For 
over a decade, a number of marketplaces have operated successfully, connecting tens of 
thousands of technology sellers and buyers (e.g., Yanagisawa & Guellec, 2009) and being 
used by prominent organizations such as NASA, Du Pont, and major academic research 
institutions (Lakhani, Lifshitz-Assaf, & Tushman, 2012; Leone & Reichstein, 2012). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that online marketplaces have the potential to expand the reach 
of markets for technology between sellers and buyers, similar to online marketplaces for 
consumer goods (e.g., Amazon or eBay), physical products, or real estate (e.g., Craigslist or 
Zillow)  (Brynjolfsson, Hu, & Simester, 2011; Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2009; Dushnitsky & 
Klueter, 2011; Palomeras, 2007). However, while a growing number of firms participate in 
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such online marketplaces (Agrawal et al., 2015b), we still know little about which industries 
are actually served by online technology markets in the first place. 
The purpose of this paper is to address this gap by investigating which industries are 
served by online technology marketplaces. That is, we ask: In what industries do online 
marketplaces exist? Do they extend to technologies from the biotechnology and 
semiconductor industries as well as the transportation and construction industries?  By 
analogy to online real estate marketplaces (like Zillow.com), we explore whether the 
marketplaces cater to properties in Boston and San Diego as well as other metropolitan areas 
like Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. This question is important, as studies in the market for 
technology typically focus on only a few industries (e.g., pharmaceuticals, chemicals) in 
which markets for technology are most prevalent (e.g., Fosfuri, 2006; Nishimura & Okada, 
2014). Yet, we know little about the presence of a market for technology in dozens of other 
industries (e.g., transportation, construction).  
The focal point of the paper is to explain which industries are served by online 
markets to begin with rather than to focus on consummated transactions between sellers and 
buyers within a marketplace (implicitly conditioned on the existence of a marketplace).  
Returning to the real estate analogy, consider the popular marketplace, Zillow.com. We focus 
on the metropolitan areas covered by Zillow, independent of which properties are ultimately 
sold. This initial search and identification of sellers and buyers – a stage which precedes the 
actual bilateral negotiations or deal-making between a pair of participants – has been shown 
as one of the most crucial but challenging stages in the market for technology, (Agrawal et 
al., 2015b).  
In particular, we examine industry characteristics that impede prospective sellers and 
buyers from identifying each other, and study the potential of online markets for technology 
to alleviate these frictions. Our theoretical arguments pivot on three salient factors that affect 
 4 
markets for technology: search costs, ambiguity with respect to the underlying technology 
and its potential applications, and concerns regarding appropriation (Akerlof, 1970; Coase, 
1960; Klevorick, Levin, Nelson, & Winter, 1995; Stigler, 1961; Teece, 1986). The frictions 
associated with these factors may prevent sellers and buyers from identifying each other and, 
in the extreme case, may altogether preclude participation in the market for technology 
(Arora et al., 2001; Teece, 1986). We exploit the fact that the magnitude of these frictions 
varies across industries and identify key features of online marketplaces that may address 
these frictions. This approach allows us to conjecture as to which industries can benefit from 
being served by online marketplaces and to empirically demonstrate what industries online 
marketplaces do – or do not – serve. Table 1 summarizes our key arguments. 
 
------- Insert Table 1 about here ---------- 
 
We posit that industries characterized by high geographic dispersion and firm 
fragmentation impose high search costs on industry participants. In those industries, an 
institution such as an Internet-based online marketplace can likely offer valuable services to 
facilitate interaction and  identification among prospective sellers and buyers of technology 
(Forman, Ghose, & Goldfarb, 2009; Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, 2003). Similarly, in industries 
with high ambiguity about the underlying technological knowledge and its potential 
applications, sellers and buyers may face challenges in sharing, communicating, and 
evaluating technological inventions. Online marketplaces mitigate ambiguity and direct 
buyers’ and sellers’ attention by offering a codified representation of all the listed 
technologies in a highly standardized manner. Online technology marketplaces therefore 
enable the assessment of a focal invention’s applicability, and facilitate its valuation by 
benchmarking it to the many other listed inventions. However, not all industries with high 
search costs and knowledge ambiguity will see the emergence of online marketplaces. Rather, 
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the advent of such an institution is shaped by its ability to protect inventors’ intellectual 
property (Teece, 1986). Because inventions that are disclosed, codified, and aggregated 
online can be at risk of imitation, we expect online markets to serve industries in which 
inventions cannot be easily expropriated, namely, industries that are characterized by strong 
appropriation regimes.  
We test our predictions using a hand-collected sample of 12 online technology 
marketplaces that connected inventors and technology sellers with technology buyers in 
2008. These marketplaces address specific industries and facilitate the listing, search, and 
exchange (i.e., licensing, sale, etc.) of innovative technologies between globally distributed 
parties. In the aggregate, the online technology marketplaces in our sample serve over 100 
different industries in agriculture, manufacturing, and information technology. Importantly, 
the cross-section of industries in our data allows us to observe notable variation in search 
costs, knowledge ambiguity, and appropriation concerns across industries. We can therefore 
investigate the impact of these industry characteristics on the presence of online markets for 
technology for a given industry. Our findings suggest that online-based marketplaces are not 
ubiquitous as one might expect. We observe systematic variation in the number of online 
marketplaces across industries, and that the variation is explained by the predicted critical 
factors (i.e., search costs, knowledge ambiguity, and appropriation). These findings 
illuminate the unique role of information technology in the market for technology and 
suggest the potential for the expansion of the market for technology through online markets.  
Finally, qualitative data and interviews with managers using online technology 
marketplaces further substantiate the implication of our investigation. The interviews reveal 
that transactions in the market for technology often originate online, where the parties 
initially identified each other, and proceed in interaction and negotiations that are 
consummated offline (Arora, 1996; Hagiu & Yoffie, 2013). This finding suggests that online 
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marketplaces have considerable potential to address frictions between sellers and buyers and 
serve as an important starting point for industry participants to identify each other. This 
aspect is not much different from the real estate context, where online listings facilitate the 
identification of opportunities and offline interaction remains important for subsequent 
actions such as inspection, due diligence, and potential haggling before a property ultimately 
changes hands.  
Our study is among the first to systematically examine multiple online markets for 
technologies that mold the interactions among sellers and buyers prior to consummation of a 
deal. Importantly, it expands the perspective on markets for technology to dozens of 
industries that have received little attention. Studying online markets for technology provides 
new insights into which industry characteristics lead to coverage of such markets by online 
technology marketplaces. In doing so, it sheds light on the initial stage of the market for 
technology, where prospective sellers and buyers initially search for, identify, and interact 
with each other. More broadly, the study explains the unique characteristics of online 
marketplaces and the role of information technology in shaping the market for technology in 
the face of search costs, knowledge ambiguity, and appropriation concerns between sellers 
and buyers. We elaborate on the implications of these findings in the discussion section.  
2. Theory and hypotheses 
2.1. The market for technology  
Prior work indicates that inventions can be codified and “disembodied” from the 
original inventor so that development and commercialization are not limited to the inventing 
person or company (Conti et al., 2013). Accordingly, a market for technology may emerge in 
which participants with new technologies interact with participants who can commercialize 
the technologies and exchange inventions for a price (Arora et al., 2001).  
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Although the market for technology is growing rapidly (Arora & Gambardella, 2010), 
we know little about either the extent to which it supports gainful innovation or the specific 
pattern of its emergence across industries. Prior work has investigated a host of factors that 
influence the way prospective sellers and buyers identify each other and interact in the market 
for technology (Agrawal et al., 2015b; Arora et al., 2001; Gans & Stern, 2003). This study 
focuses on three of the most salient frictions this literature identifies, which relate to (a) the 
cost of searching for quality inventions across different geographies and companies, (b) the 
challenge of communicating and assessing technologies when ambiguity exists about the 
underlying knowledge and its potential applications, and (c) the difficulty of appropriating 
the value of an invention (Akerlof, 1970; Coase, 1960; Levin et al., 1987; Teece, 1986). 
Absent a mechanism to address these frictions, they can substantially affect the process by 
which sellers and buyers notice and identify each other and in the extreme case may distort 
the market for technology altogether (Agrawal et al., 2015b). Indeed, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that many viable technologies can remain “locked” or underused within firms (BTG, 
1998; Danneels, 2007; Giuri et al., 2007; Rivette & Kline, 2000). 
Researchers have identified institutions that address the aforementioned frictions in 
the market for technology, including patent lawyers (Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, 2003), 
accounting and financial accounting service firms (Zhang & Li, 2010), government agencies 
(Arora et al., 2001; Yusuf, 2008), and regional organizations (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). We 
follow this stream of literature and study the recent emergence of a new institution: online 
markets for technology. These marketplaces may facilitate the functioning of a working 
market for technology, allowing us to systematically investigate which industries could 
benefit from such online marketplaces and the industry characteristics associated with the 
emergence of an active online marketplace for ideas.  
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2.2.    Online markets for technology  
Recent research suggest that a growing number of firms today use online 
marketplaces to mitigate frictions in the market for technology (Agrawal et al., 2015b). 
Following Bakos (1998), we stipulate that online marketplaces serve as virtual markets that 
facilitate the listing of, search for, and exchange of inventions. These are two-sided markets 
that support matching and efficient distribution of information in a timely manner 
(Dushnitsky & Klueter, 2011; Gans & Stern, 2010). A marketplace connects and promotes 
transactions between two pools of participants (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). It 
accommodates inventors (henceforth sellers) who list their inventions in the marketplace and 
potential licensees or investors (henceforth buyers) who can search the listed information 
online and engage with the sellers. Online knowledge marketplaces are independent from 
buyers and sellers and provide an online platform (e.g., a website) through which participants 
can communicate, find a match, and potentially initiate a transaction. Such marketplaces have 
appeared in many other settings, such as the real estate market (Zillow.com) and the labor 
market (Monster.com) (Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2009).  
The marketplaces we study tend to facilitate trade in a type of invention wherein the 
intellectual property is at least partially embedded in a legal right such as a patent.  A unique 
feature of these institutions is that they are virtual – that is, the initial interactions among 
market participants take place through a dedicated interface on the Internet. One of the most 
prominent marketplaces in this category is yet2.com, which was launched in 1999. A few 
online markets draw inventions predominantly from universities or public research institutes 
(e.g., Flintbox and iBridgenetwork), while others receive the majority of inventions from the 
private sector (e.g., Tynax and yet2.com). Table 2 provides an overview over the 
marketplaces we examine and offers some background as to their mission and functionality. 
  
--- Insert Table 2 about here---- 
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Online technology markets allow us to observe active markets for technology across a 
broad range of industries. To the extent that understanding the process by which prospective 
sellers and buyers take notice of and identify each other is crucial for the market for 
technology (Agrawal et al., 2015b), the study of online marketplaces can illuminate such 
dynamics in many different sectors. Moreover, our hypotheses focus on the unique features 
of an online marketplace and how these features address the frictions in the market for 
technology. We expect online markets to emerge in those industries in which their potential 
to address frictions is greater. The next sections develop hypotheses regarding the impact of 
industry characteristics associated with market frictions (i.e., search costs, ambiguity, and 
appropriation) and how they affect the likelihood that the industry will be served by online 
marketplaces. 
2.3. Search costs 
Search costs refer to the costs of identifying and finding transaction partners and may 
profoundly affect buyers and sellers in the market for technology (Stigler, 1961). Online 
markets may address these frictions and therefore could be particularly well suited to 
industries in which search costs are high.  
Seminal work describes the roots of search costs, noting that a single firm cannot 
possess all relevant information since information about opportunities and potential partners 
is dispersed among industry actors and geographic locations (Stigler, 1961). In particular, 
search costs consist of two key elements: (a) the cost of “discover[ing] who it is that one 
wishes to deal with and. inform[ing] people that one wishes to deal with” (Coase, 1960:7), 
and (b) the foregone payoffs associated with the time and resources spent searching and 
screening potential transaction partners (Bakos, 1997). In the context of new technological 
opportunities, these costs may be substantial and the participants may either forego economic 
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activity altogether or accept sub-optimal matches (March & Simon, 1958). Indeed, prior 
research highlights that the basic identification of sellers and buyers poses a major hurdle in 
the market for technology and the problem is exacerbated when sellers/buyers are not in 
geographic proximity (Agrawal et al., 2015b; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).  
Arora and colleagues (2001) emphasize that search costs may vary across industries. 
An important characteristic of an industry is how sellers and buyers of knowledge are 
dispersed around the globe. The adverse effect of geographical distance is twofold. First, 
firms commonly find that physical distance hinders them from being informed about 
technological inventions originating in distant locations (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). For 
example, the role of clusters in effective knowledge sharing is typically attributed to firms’ 
abilities to co-locate and benefit from knowledge spillovers (Jaffe, 1986).1 Second, crossing 
large distances usually implies not only that one has to traverse a vast geographical space, but 
also that one encounters unfamiliar local contexts (e.g., a country with unique characteristics 
or culture) (Castellani, Jimenez, & Zanfei, 2013; Kranenburg, Hagedoorn, & Lorenz‐Orlean, 
2014). It follows that an industry, in which actors are dispersed across countries increases the 
cost of searching for new technologies.  
An online marketplace can alleviate the search costs associated with geographic 
dispersion and may unlock the potential to connect distant parties. Online marketplaces are 
characterized by open networks and connectivity, which allow participants to observe and 
communicate with distant and diverse constituencies (Amit & Zott, 2001; Bakos, 1997; 
Garicano & Kaplan, 2001). These characteristics imply that online marketplaces have broad 
reach. That is, they can cater to a large number of participants because the marginal cost of 
adding a seller or buyer is low (Brews & Tucci, 2004). Thus, online markets ease the 
                                                            
1
  Note that knowledge flows remain geographically bounded even in the presence of well-known central 
knowledge repositories, such as a patent office directory (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993).  
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identification of other participants in the market for technology, and such benefit increases 
the more severe the search costs in an industry. 
Online markets are not constrained by geographical boundaries and can connect a 
large number of participants with access to Internet infrastructure (Amit & Zott, 2001). This 
ability to connect suggests that online markets for technology may offer important benefits to 
industries in which actors are dispersed around the globe. For example, online markets 
require inventors to list their technologies through uniform representations of information, 
using standardized templates for every technology. Such a common data structure, paired 
with the use of a common language, speeds the search process, enhances the scope of the 
search, and substantially reduces the cost of transmitting and exchanging information across 
geographic boundaries (Brews & Tucci, 2004). Indeed, recent work suggests that the use of 
web-based technology platforms alleviates the cost of search across geographic distance 
(Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2015a), and the use of online 
communication facilitates access to scientific repositories (Agrawal & Goldfarb, 2008). 
Drawing on these arguments, we conjecture that online markets are well positioned to 
decrease search costs stemming from the geographic distance between technology sellers and 
buyers. We therefore expect that online markets emerge in industries where frictions due to 
geographical dispersion are most salient.  
Hypothesis 1a: An industry where search costs are high, such as an industry characterized by 
high levels of geographic dispersion, is more likely to be served by online marketplaces. 
 Search costs may arise from factors other than geographic dispersion. They may also 
be associated with the number of firms in an industry such that highly fragmented industries 
– that is, industries characterized by many firms – experience higher search costs. 
Fragmentation can exacerbate search costs because emerging knowledge may be 
characterized by uncertainty regarding (a) the feasibility of a technology (i.e., will it work?), 
(b) the technology’s viability (i.e., is there a market for it?), and (c) other uses for the 
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technology (i.e., what other, potentially better, applications might the technology have?) 
(Cassimon, De Backer, Engelen, Van Wouwe, & Yordanov, 2011). This uncertainty suggests 
that the search process faces two hurdles. First, a firm has to search for a technology among a 
fragmented group of peers. Second, the observed applications may not be a good fit for the 
firm and may distract from identifying the best use.2  
Industry fragmentation likely increases the two key elements of search costs: (a) the 
cost of searching across multiple prospective partners (Coase, 1960), and (b) the opportunity 
cost owing to foregone time and resources spent searching (Bakos, 1997). Simply put, in the 
presence of multiple firms generating knowledge, remaining informed about all possible 
technological opportunities can be challenging. Opportunity cost rises because fragmented 
knowledge requires more time and resources for making comparisons. Thus the more 
fragmented an industry, the more effort is needed to sift through multiple firms and the 
various potentially less relevant technologies and related applications they pursue (Basalla, 
1988). The bio-pharmaceutical industry provides an example, as technological change is 
predominantly driven by a multitude of science-based startups (Arora & Gambardella, 1994; 
Cohen & Levin, 1989). Established firms incur considerable costs in attempting to stay 
updated about technological change, and often they resort to establishing units dedicated to 
searching for and evaluating new technologies (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Monteiro & 
Birkinshaw, 2016). 
As with geographic dispersion, online markets can mitigate the search costs in those 
industries where the knowledge base is fragmented. The marketplaces are easily scalable, 
may encompass a plethora of participants, and consequently offer a timely and cost-effective 
                                                            
2
 One can think of the search for a knowledge asset as a search for a unique asset for which few buyers or sellers 
exist in the market (like, for example, unique paintings or baseball cards) (Stigler, 1961). While Stigler indicated 
that for such unique goods search costs will be high (as there is not really a market owing to a low number of 
participants), we predict that the fragmentation of actors may lead to higher search costs since potential sellers 
and buyers are confronted with a plurality of possibilities and can predict little as to which technology will be 
ultimately useful. 
 13 
way to search potential different partners (Brews & Tucci, 2004). They are therefore 
particularly suited to addressing search challenges in fragmented industries (Evans & 
Wurster, 1999). The business media echo this observation: “The problem that people have 
when looking for technology is they can’t spend hours . . . . IP exchanges that offer attractive 
search tools for the user . . . are more likely to attract potential licensees” (Tactics, 2008). 
Thus we expect online markets to emerge in industries with fragmented actors. 
In addition, online marketplaces are inclusive and cater to a wide range of potential 
buyers and sellers. This feature can help identify potential new technology-application 
combinations, as sellers/buyers get exposed to a broad range of novel partners (Jeppesen & 
Lakhani, 2010). The sheer number of participants increases the likelihood of an invention’s 
exposure to potential buyers from distant domains. Robert Hirsch, managing director of 
Licensing and DuPont Ventures, explained the important role of online markets for DuPont, 
saying: “We use yet2.com to help find licensees that we wouldn’t normally know how to get 
to” (Wood & Scott, 2004:20). Consider, by analogy, the emergence of the long-tail 
phenomenon owing to online retailing. Online retail marketplaces such as Amazon have 
enabled sellers and buyers of specialty products – which were previously underserved – to 
come together and engage in valuable exchanges (Brynjolfsson et al., 2011; Brynjolfsson, 
Hu, & Smith, 2006). The result has been an overall expansion in the size of transactions 
within the book and music industries. In a similar vein, online marketplaces are not only 
associated with a quantitative decrease in the cost of search, but can also lead to a qualitative 
change in the type of connections. The latter feature is particular salient in industries where 
knowledge is fragmented. 
In summary, we expect that highly fragmented industries are ripe for the emergence 
of new institutions that mitigate search costs. 
Hypothesis 1b: An industry where search costs are high, such as an industry characterized 
by high levels of industry-fragmentation, is more likely to be served by online marketplaces. 
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While the market for technology facilitates the identification of sellers and buyers by 
mitigating search costs, participants in the market still face difficulties in communicating and 
sharing information about their underlying technological knowledge and its benefits across a 
wide range of potential applications. We next explore these frictions and how online markets 
may address them.  
2.4.    Knowledge ambiguity  
Ambiguity regarding the technological value of an invention and its possible 
applications can also hinder the market for technology. The level of technological ambiguity 
varies across industries (Klevorick et al., 1995), and this cross-industry variation affects the 
ability to contract and trade in innovative technologies (Anand & Khanna, 2000).  
Specifically, ambiguity with respect to the underlying knowledge impedes the effective 
interpretation and communication of the knowledge. Prior work notes that sellers and buyers 
in the market for technology do not easily recognize the value of technological inventions 
that are characterized by a high level of ambiguity (Rosenberg, 1996; Simonin, 1999). We 
consider two forces driving such ambiguity. First, ambiguity regarding the underlying 
technological knowledge may result from multiple and diverging technological trajectories. 
Second, ambiguity can stem from the unknown potential of applications with which a 
technology can be ultimately associated. However, both of these challenges may be alleviated 
by online marketplaces. 
Ambiguity regarding technological trajectories  
The rapid pace of technological change contributes to the level of ambiguity within a 
given industry. In particular, the emergence of multiple technological paths at the scientific 
frontier will subsequently lead to technological change. Ultimately, a few of the technologies 
will prove useful and will result in productivity gains for the focal industry (Hicks & Hegde, 
 15 
2005).  The Solow Residual (also called multifactor productivity) captures such productivity 
gains, which are attributed to technological innovation rather than to growth in labor or 
capital inputs (Powell & Snellman, 2004). Prior research suggests that high levels of 
multifactor productivity exist in industries where technological frontiers are pushed forward 
and are associated with large-scale technological change (Griliches & Lichtenberg, 1984; 
Solow, 1957; Terleckyj, 1980). Such a high level of industry multifactor productivity is 
characteristic of an industry that is continuously experiencing new technological trajectories 
(Schilling & Steensma, 2001), while the onslaught of multiple technology trajectories is also 
indicative of a potential increase in ambiguity in that industry.3  
The ensuing ambiguity affects the market for technology, because emerging 
technologies often depart from existing industry solutions and lead to many new 
technological trajectories (Hicks & Hegde, 2005). At the extreme, the constant influx of 
emerging technologies will render existing solutions obsolete and cast doubt on the viability 
of future technological trajectories. The problem is exacerbated by marketplace participants’ 
lack of a clear benchmark or dominant design that could be used as a reference point to assess 
a focal technological invention (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). The result is an increase in the 
level of ambiguity with respect to the features inherent to the underlying technologies. Hence, 
ambiguity with respect to the features of the technology owing to multiple technological 
paths will increase the challenges of technology sellers and buyers to effectively 
communicate and evaluate technological inventions in the first place (Madhavan & Prescott, 
1995). 
Online markets are well positioned to address these challenges. First, technology 
owners who participate in an online market for technology have an opportunity to clearly 
                                                            
3
 While it is clear that productivity gains observed through multifactor productivity may stem from substantial 
incremental demand for existing technologies, high levels of multifactor productivity likely require more radical 
technological improvements stemming from new emerging technological trajectories.  
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communicate their technology to external parties. Online markets require disclosure and 
codification from each technology seller in the form of a standardized description of the 
invention, which is to be listed on a marketplace. Detailed disclosure reduces challenges 
stemming from ambiguity about the technology because (a) the codification process of listed 
inventions clarifies important technological information and (b) the codification is done in a 
consistent and standardized manner through standard entry templates. Most importantly, 
codification results in the technology seller’s clear articulation of an invention’s fundamental 
standalone features.  A quote from yet2.com, a prominent marketplace in our sample, 
exemplifies these benefits: “Because patent abstracts are designed to protect an idea from 
infringement, they obscure the technology, making it difficult for potential buyers to imagine 
relevant applications. Conversely, yet2.com features functional abstracts written in plain 
English to communicate the potential … benefits of the technology.” (Yet2.com, 2008)  
Hence, the articulation and codification of technological inventions ultimately reduce 
frictions associated with knowledge ambiguity. 
Second, online markets accumulate and aggregate information across a broad range of 
listings in an industry (Evans & Wurster, 1999). The aggregate information about a wide 
range of technologies implies that participants in an online marketplace can go beyond 
assessing the technological feasibility and potential applications of a single invention. Rather, 
participants can compare and contrast each listing with a multitude of alternatives. In other 
words, online marketplaces facilitate comparison and benchmarking of different 
technological inventions. In a similar vein, the assessment of new and ambiguous 
technologies is easier when inventions can be compared to alternatives (Grégoire & 
Shepherd, 2012). Thus, by aggregating information across multiple inventions, online 
marketplaces facilitate relevant comparisons and mitigate ambiguity with respect to the 
multiple technological trajectories.   
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It follows that the aggregation of codified information is a hallmark of online 
marketplaces, as it equips market participants with templates and the ability to make 
comparisons. Accordingly, we expect online marketplaces to provide unique benefits in 
industries experiencing high ambiguity owing to the presence of multiple technological 
trajectories. We therefore propose: 
Hypothesis 2a: An industry where ambiguity about technological trajectories is high, such as 
one characterized by a high level of multifactor productivity, is more likely to be served by 
online marketplaces. 
Ambiguity regarding potential applications 
Ambiguity may arise not only with respect to the identity of the technology trajectory 
that will ultimately prevail, but also regarding the potential applications of that winning 
technology. Simply put, the new technology may have applications that go well beyond those 
of the previous technology. Whether that is the case, and what the additional applications 
might be, remains unclear during the days of technological ferment. This insight dates back to 
Penrose (1959:76), who emphasized that “at any given time, the known productive services 
inherent in a resource do not exhaust the full potential of the resource.” This perspective 
suggests that technologies may have not one application but possibly many.4 Frictions in the 
market for technology emerge because a given technology has to be linked to potential 
applications, yet the links may be unknown to both the inventor and external parties. Indeed, 
discovering alternative applications for a focal technology is far from a trivial undertaking 
(Danneels, 2007; Rivette & Kline, 2000). The result is ambiguity regarding the feasible 
applications for the technology. Such ambiguity imposes limitations on the market for 
technology, since many potential technology applications may not be uncovered. 
                                                            
4
 A case in point is DuPont’s Teflon (polytetrafluoroethylene). The technology has distinct technological 
properties (e.g., heat resistance and a low coefficient of fricton). Teflon’s market applications span a broad 
range of industries including automobiles (for paint), housing, cookware, and photovoltaic energy products. 
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The extent of these frictions may vary across industries. An industry with strong 
linkages to other industries faces a particular challenge because the knowledge underlying a 
technological invention is context-specific: that is, the knowledge usually resides within a 
given firm and industry and tends to be associated with its existing organizational and 
industrial processes and applications (Winter, 1987). This “local” context clouds the ability to 
see all the different applications for a particular technology, and the challenge is exacerbated 
in settings where potential applications lie outside the focal industry (Dushnitsky & Klueter, 
2016; Kogut & Zander, 1992). It stands to reason that industries that link intensively to 
products and technologies from other industries are particularly prone to ambiguity regarding 
the technology’s possible applications.   
  Online marketplaces mitigate the challenge of application ambiguity. An important 
prerequisite to exploring the full range of applications for a technology lies in understanding 
the underlying characteristics and functionality of a technology and de-linking the technology 
from its existing applications and organizational context (Danneels, 2002; Grégoire & 
Shepherd, 2012). This result is achieved through the codification process of online markets 
by technology owners, who need to emphasize fundamental standalone features independent 
of the technology’s existing application (Conti et al., 2013; Danneels, 2007). De-linking 
technological solutions from applications in online markets has noteworthy implications.  
First, de-linking simplifies the representation of technological inventions and 
demonstrates their value beyond their firm-specific applications, likely facilitating the 
discovery of alternative applications for a technology (Dushnitsky & Klueter, 2016). Second, 
online markets rely on external partners to develop technological inventions. By definition, 
external partners are less encumbered by existing commercial routines or embedded 
competencies for a focal technology, and are therefore effective in facilitating novel linkages 
between a technology and its applications. Robert Hirsch (Wood, 2002) explained the 
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advantage of online markets like yet2.com to address previously unconsidered application 
domains for DuPont: “But it's quite unlike process licensing, where we know who the 
potential customers are. It requires a very different marketing approach. Often … potential 
customers are from industries we would never normally have considered." 
In summary, online markets for technology can systematically facilitate the 
identification of new technology-application combinations by market participants. We expect 
that the advantages of such processes are most notable in industries where ambiguity about 
potential applications is widespread, either within or beyond industry boundaries – namely, in 
those industries that exhibit substantial product and technology linkages with other industries.  
We therefore propose:  
Hypothesis 2b: An industry where ambiguity about the possible applications for a 
technological invention is high, such as one characterized by strong linkages with other 
industries, is more likely to be served by online marketplaces. 
Finally, ambiguity also exists regarding the extent to which the new technology will 
affect industry profitability. Put differently, the magnitude of value creation and value capture 
is also unknown from the outset. How much will a given firm gain by applying the new rather 
than the old technology? Indeed, experts often differ in their evaluations of organizations 
within those industries. Experts covering an industry characterized by strong knowledge 
ambiguity may find it difficult to agree on and assign specific values for focal organizations 
(Madhavan & Prescott, 1995; Rindova, Ferrier, & Wiltbank, 2010). Substantial disagreement 
among experts suggests a divergence of views and has been attributed to the challenge of 
evaluating knowledge-based assets (e.g., Humphery‐Jenner, 2013; Martin, Gözübüyük, & 
Becerra, 2013; Rindova et al., 2010). Put differently, industries in which experts form 
divergent expectations (e.g., financial analysts’ expectations about future performance) are 
likely to be characterized by high levels of knowledge ambiguity.  
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In accordance with our prior arguments, we expect that the articulation and 
codification processes that are integral to the working of online markets will mitigate 
ambiguity. It follows that online marketplaces for technology will be particularly valuable in 
industries where experts vary in their assessment of existing organizations’ values. We 
therefore propose:  
Hypothesis 2c: An industry where ambiguity about the underlying technological inventions 
is high, such as one characterized by high levels of dispersion in expert opinions, is more 
likely to be served by online marketplaces. 
The unique features of online markets may alleviate search costs and ambiguity 
frictions, thus facilitating the identification, communication and interaction among 
prospective sellers and buyers. However, that facilitation may deter technology owners from 
participating on online marketplaces owing to the risk of expropriation. 
2.5.   Appropriation 
A critical challenge in the innovation process has to do with technology owners’ 
limited ability to appropriate the returns from their invention. Formally, the economic 
properties of inventions make them a public good (Arrow, 1962): a potential buyer or 
licensee cannot easily be prevented from using an invention once it has been revealed. This 
appropriation problem limits an inventor’s ability to fully capture the value of the invention, 
since revealing the invention to prospective licensees may lead to imitation. The limited 
protection of property rights over inventions often poses a critical challenge, as it implies that 
an invention can be easily exploited and replicated without the owner’s permission (Arrow, 
1962). 
The appropriation problem is of particular concern in some industries. In other 
industries, conditions such as the prevailing legal environment may provide strong protection 
to inventors and thus circumvent imitation (Levin et al., 1987). The likelihood of imitation is 
affected by the intellectual property right (IPR) regime (Teece, 1986). For example, a patent 
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is a well-recognized means of IPR protection that gives inventors legal rights over their 
inventions. Recall that a patent is often the “unit” that is traded in the online marketplaces we 
study. The efficacy of patents in appropriating value varies across industries: in industries 
with a strong IPR regime, patent holders face fewer concerns related to appropriation. Indeed, 
in the presence of weak patent protection, the market for technology sees less participation 
(Giarratana & Mariani, 2014).  
While online marketplaces attenuate the frictions of search costs and information 
asymmetries, in so doing they may magnify the appropriation problem for technology sellers. 
Recall that online marketplaces mitigate search costs and ambiguity by including a broad 
range of industry participants and presenting them with rich codified descriptions of the listed 
inventions. Because of this practice, however, online markets may put inventors at a 
disadvantage since the higher level of codification may facilitate imitation. The problem is 
compounded because the people who browse the marketplace remain anonymous and can 
imitate a listed invention without the inventor’s awareness. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the issue of expropriation is affecting online marketplaces: “technology descriptions listed in 
our database become part of the public domain. Only you can determine what you are willing 
to disclose to the public about your technology” (Yet2.com, 2008).  
It follows that technology sellers participating in online marketplaces are sensitive to 
expropriation by prospective buyers: the greater the likelihood that potential buyers and 
licensees will exploit disclosed information, the greater the risk that the inventors will 
appropriate little or none of the value from their invention (Anton & Yao, 1995, 2005; Gans 
& Stern, 2003). The willingness of technology owners to participate and list their inventions 
in an online marketplace will therefore be shaped by the IPR regime in that industry. It will 
be low under a weak IPR regime and high in a strong IPR regime. Accordingly, we 
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conjecture that a marketplace is more likely to serve an industry when it can attract the 
participation of high-quality technology sellers. 
Hypothesis 3: An industry where the threat of appropriation is low, such as an industry 
characterized by a strong intellectual property protection regime, is more likely to be served 
by online marketplaces. 
3. Methods 
We study how search costs, knowledge ambiguity, and appropriation regimes inform 
which industries are served by a range of online technology markets. Our sample included 
marketplaces that allow independent parties to trade technological inventions for commercial 
purposes. We focused on all industries listed as part of the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) in agriculture, industrial manufacturing, and information 
technology services. To test our hypotheses, we employed multiple data sources, including 
Compustat (public firms R&D data), the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) survey, IBES 
(analyst earnings forecasts) and CRSP (stock prices). 
3.1. Sample construction 
Online marketplaces. We identified 12 leading online marketplaces that in 2008 were 
actively connecting inventors or technology sellers with potential technology buyers or 
licensees. These marketplaces addressed specific industries and facilitated the trade (i.e., 
licensing, sale, etc.) of innovative technologies between numerous globally distributed 
parties.  
We followed an extensive three-stage search procedure to identify the marketplaces. 
First, we queried numerous databases (e.g., ABI Inform, Google, Lexis Nexis, Proquest) for 
information published in the business media during the period 1999–2008. The queries 
consisted of variations of the following keywords: (online, electronic, Internet), (marketplace, 
market, platform, exchange), and (innovation, invention, technology, knowledge). This 
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search generated an initial list of online marketplaces, some of which had already received 
scholarly attention, such as yet.2com (e.g. Palomeras, 2007).5 To avoid inclusion of low-
quality or limited-transaction volume marketplaces, we excluded websites that were not 
mentioned as online marketplaces in a major credible business source (e.g., we excluded 
invention promotion scam sites).6 A marketplace entered our sample only if it was mentioned 
at least once in an article covered by Lexis Nexis, Proquest, or ABI Inform. In addition, we 
read all news articles to further ascertain marketplace quality. In total, eight websites did not 
meet the requirements of our quality filters and were excluded from the analysis.7  
Next, to enter our sample, a marketplace had to meet the theoretical features of an 
online marketplace. Specifically, it had to serve as a two-sided market. Accordingly, we 
excluded “one-sided” university websites aimed at technology transfer of inventions from a 
single institution (e.g., technology licensing offices of MIT and Harvard), as well as websites 
dedicated to the commercialization of government agencies’ inventions (e.g., the US 
Department of Defense). 
Finally, we required that each online market categorize its listings by assigning 
systematic sectors or identifiers to technologies listed on the marketplace. As a result, three 
more online marketplaces were dropped from our sample (Techtransferonline, NewIdeatrade, 
Spark-IP). The final sample consisted of 12 online technology marketplaces active in 2008 
(see Table 2).  
                                                            
5
 As an example of the characteristics of online knowledge marketplaces, we looked closely at the inventions 
listed on yet2.com as of 2008. We identified 1,450 inventions, of which 65% had associated patents or patent 
applications.  
6
 The reason for coverage in a newspaper was to ensure that we do not include invention promotion scam sites 
such as http://newInventions.com. The US government explicitly warns technology sellers against using such 
patent websites (see http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/using-legal-services/scam-prevention). 
7
 Excluded marketplaces for which we could not find a newspaper article included those like 
http://www.ideabuyer.com/, for which we could not adequately assess the quality when we engaged in the 
sampling effort.  
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Sample observations. Our analysis covered all industries listed at the NAICS 4-digit level 
within the agriculture (NAICS 1xxx), manufacturing (NAICS 3xxx), and information and 
business services (NAICS 5xxx)8 sectors. A total of 161 distinct industries were included at 
the 4-digit level of NAICS. We considered these industries to have the potential of being 
served by online marketplaces. A few 4-digit NAICS were dropped due to limited data for 
our independent variables. Specifically, 13 NAICS industries were eliminated because they 
were not populated by a sufficient number of publicly listed companies during our study 
period of 2002–2007.9 The final sample consisted of 148 industries. 
3.2. Measures 
Dependent variable: The dependent variable Industry Coverage is a count measure, 
capturing the number of online markets that served a focal 4-digit NAICS industry in 2008. 
The construction of the variable entailed several steps: (a) identifying the sectors served by 
online marketplaces, (b) matching them to NACIS industry codes, and (c) generating the 
measure. We expand below. 
Online markets classify technology listings into different categories or keywords 
reflecting industry sectors. We collected these industry sectors listed on each online 
marketplace and mapped them onto NAICS codes as of 2008. The reason for using industry 
codes based on the NAICS schema is twofold. First, the NAICS codes provide a greater level 
of granularity than Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes. Second, the scheme has 
been specifically designed to reflect the structural transformation due to the “new economy” 
(Landefeld & Fraumeni, 2001).   
                                                            
8
 Excluding Finance and Insurance and Real Estate. We use the 4-digit NAICS code as the construction of 
several of our independent variables was limited to the 4-digit level. We explain these constraints below.  
9
 We excluded industries with two or fewer public firms (e.g., potato farming). In an additional robustness 
analysis, we show that industries with only a few public firms are not driving the results. 
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Two independent researchers matched the marketplaces’ sectors to NAICS codes. 
Each sector could be assigned to multiple NAICS codes. As an example, the iBridgenetwork 
sector “dental” was matched to NAICS 339114 (Dental Equipment and Supplies 
Manufacturing), NAICS 339116 (Dental laboratories), and NAICS 325620 (Toilet 
Preparation Manufacturing).10 However, it was not matched to NAICS 335999 (Ultrasonic 
Cleaning Equipment), which explicitly excludes any dental equipment.11 As a further quality 
control, we compared the NAICS assignment in different marketplaces to verify that 
classifications were consistent. For example, the sector “dental” also appears in the 
Ideaconnection and Flintbox marketplaces. Inter-coder agreement was high (80%), and 
unclear matches were discussed among the researchers until mutual agreement was achieved. 
The variable Industry Coverage is the number of online markets serving a focal 4-
digit NAICS industry. Given that our sample contains 12 marketplaces, Industry Coverage is 
a count measure ranging from 0 (not served by any online market) to 12 (served by all online 
markets).12  
Independent variables: All independent variables were constructed using information 
in years prior to observing the categories used to construct the dependent variable Industry 
Coverage in 2008.  
Search costs: We captured search costs that characterize an industry by examining the 
distribution of potential technology sellers and technology buyers as proxied by 
fragmentation and geographic dispersion in that industry. For industry fragmentation, we 
                                                            
10
 Includes dental floss manufacturing. 
11
 Ultrasonic cleaning equipment (except dental, medical) manufacturing. 
12
 In many cases, the keywords found on the online marketplace allowed us to distinguish the industries on a 4-
digit NAICS level. A more refined categorization proved infeasible. As an example, while we could distinguish 
beverage manufacturing as an industry NAICS, it was harder to identify in the categories beer vs. wine vs. 
distilleries or soft drinks (subcategories of that industry). However, replicating our analysis by using 5-digit 
NAICS codes confirmed our results. 
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calculated the Herfindahl index based on Compustat/Compustat Global R&D expense data 
from 2002–2007 considering 20,122 firms:  
 =

	

 
where H is the concentration of firms, si is the market share of firm i in the industry, and N is 
the number of firms in a given industry per year. We averaged the annual concentration score 
for each industry between 2002 and 2007 to create a single industry concentration score. The 
variable Industry Fragmentation equals one minus the Herfindahl concentration. A large 
value for Industry Fragmentation indicates a highly fragmented industry in terms of R&D 
spending.  
In a similar vein, we constructed Geographic Dispersion based on Compustat sales 
data, which covered 96 countries. Again, we use the same Herfindahl index-based approach, 
where si represents the market share in terms of revenue of a country i in an industry. Higher 
values suggest more country fragmentation of activities within an industry. 
Ambiguity: Following our theoretical arguments we captured ambiguity through 
multifactor productivity, industry linkages and the dispersion in forecasts by industry experts. 
Multifactor productivity: We captured the level of ambiguity with respect to emerging 
technological trajectories using an industry measure of multifactor productivity. The measure 
is commonly employed in economics and strategy literature as a proxy for technological 
change and an indicator of multiple technological paths (Griliches & Lichtenberg, 1984; 
Schilling & Steensma, 2001). Multifactor productivity values are calculated annually by the 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Specifically, for each industry, the BLS calculates the output 
per unit of labor, capital, and other measurable inputs (Harper, Khandrika, Kinoshita, & 
Rosenthal, 2010). Our Multifactor Productivity variable is the mean multifactor productivity 
for each 4-digit NAICS code during the 2002–2007 period. 
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Industry linkages: We captured the linkages to other industries (our proxy for 
ambiguity with respect to potential applications) by calculating the average correlation of a 
focal industry to all other industries using direct input/output tables. Following prior work, 
we proxied for the strengths of inter-industry linkages between a given industry and how its 
outputs are used by other industries using inter-industry flows of products and services. 
Higher correlations between industries indicate strong inter-industry linkages and potential 
for synergies (e.g., Villalonga, 2004). We employed input/output tables that are available 
through the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). For each industry, we calculated the 
correlation across industries and took the average value: the higher the value, the higher (on 
average) the linkages of a focal industry with other industries. Owing to missing data, we 
were able to construct this variable for only 116 industries. 
Expert Forecast Dispersion: We directly proxied the level of knowledge ambiguity in 
an industry using the dispersion in expert assessments. To that end, we collected expert 
analysts’ forecasts from the IBES database. The data covered all publicly listed firms in US 
and non-US stock exchanges for 2002–2007 (e.g., Humphery‐Jenner, 2013; Madhavan & 
Prescott, 1995; Rindova et al., 2010). We excluded observations for penny stocks (<1%) and 
extreme outliers from our analysis (e.g., Feldman, Gilson, & Villalonga, 2013). We were able 
to match about 4.3 million analyst estimates to a firm identifier (i.e., a firm’s industry NAICS 
code from Compustat and its stock price from CRSP). Consistent with prior studies, we 
required at least three analyst estimates per forecast period of a firm, and calculated the 
analyst dispersion for each firm forecast period (e.g., Martin et al., 2013). To facilitate 
comparison across firms, we divided the dispersion in forecasted stock prices by the firm’s 
stock price at the end of the forecast period. Finally, we created the industry average, 
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Forecast Dispersion, by taking the mean value of forecast dispersion across all firms within a 
4-digit NAICS code (e.g., Madhavan & Prescott, 1995).13  
Appropriation: We used the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) Survey of Research  
and Development (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000) to construct a proxy of industry 
appropriation regime. The CMU survey explores the effectiveness of various mechanisms in 
protecting profits due to invention. The variable CMU Patenting captures the relative 
importance of patenting as a way to protect intellectual property. It uses the item for the mean 
percentage of product innovations for which patenting was considered to be an effective 
mechanism in protecting intellectual property within an industry (e.g. Dushnitsky & Lenox, 
2005). The higher the value of CMU Patenting, the stronger the appropriation regime within 
the industry. Owing to missing data, we were able to construct this variable for 101 
industries. 
Controls: We controlled for a number of industry characteristics that might further 
determine the prevalence of online markets.  First, we controlled for an industry’s R&D 
Intensity as a proxy for the general emphasis of technology within an industry (e.g., 
Klevorick et al., 1995): the greater the R&D in a focal industry, the greater the potential for 
online markets to serve that industry. The variable R&D Intensity is defined as average R&D 
spending over total revenue from 2002 to 2007, using Compustat data. In a similar vein, we 
also controlled explicitly for “high technology” industries using a classification from the US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly Labor Review (Hecker, 2005). BLS classifies industries 
as “high technology” by taking into consideration whether employment in technology-
oriented occupations accounted for a proportion of that industry's total employment that is 
double that of the overall economy average. High Technology is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 if an industry is so classified by BLS. 
                                                            
13
 For readability of the regression analysis, we multiplied the Forecast Dispersion variable by 100.  
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We also controlled for the average Number of Firms as reported in Compustat 
between 2002 and 2007, as more public firms may attract coverage by online markets. 
Moreover, we controlled for an industry’s overall performance through its average Return on 
Assets (RoA) in years 2002–2007, as higher profitability may make the industry more 
attractive for online marketplaces. Further, we controlled for the importance of 
commercialization capabilities in an industry using a proxy of industry commercialization 
intensity, which is calculated as the average ratio of selling, general and administrative 
expenses relative to total revenues from 2002–2007 in an industry (Rothaermel, 2001; Teece, 
1986). 
3.3. Empirical specification 
The dependent variable Industry Coverage is a non-negative count variable. 
Accordingly, we estimated a negative binomial model, which is similar to a Poisson model 
but relaxes the assumption of having a mean equal to the standard deviation.14 All results 
reported are with robust standard errors.   
4.  Results  
4.1. Hypotheses testing  
Table 3 depicts descriptive statistics and a bivariate correlation matrix. On average, an 
industry (as defined by a 4-digit NAICS code) is served by 3.22 online marketplaces. 
Specifically, of the 148 industries, 41 are not served by a single marketplace while the 
remaining 109 are served by one or more marketplaces. With respect to the correlation 
matrix, we found no evidence that multicollinearity is a concern. The mean VIF for the final 
models is below 2.6 and individual VIFs are below 4.4, below the recommended cutoff levels 
                                                            
14
 The test of the over-dispersion parameter alpha fails to reject the null hypothesis that alpha equals zero. 
Hence, the negative binomial model is preferred to the Poisson regression model.  
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(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).  Table 4 provides an overview of the top and bottom 
covered industries by the online markets for technology and provides further insights as to the 
patterns of our independent variables. 
 
--------------Insert TABLES 3 and 4 about here. -------------- 
 
Table 6 reports regression analysis results. Model 1 reports the base specification with 
only control variables. We do not observe High Tech industries served by a larger number of 
online marketplaces, but this result can be partially explained by the effect of R&D Intensity 
on the coverage by online marketplaces. We also find that the Number of Firms and the 
industry’s Return on Assets are associated with Industry Coverage.  An industry’s SG&A 
Intensity is not significantly associated with the likelihood of that industry being served by 
online marketplaces.  
Model 2 introduces the effect of search costs due to Geographic Dispersion. The 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, the findings 
suggest that online markets serve those industries that experience the greatest need to search 
for novel technologies all across the globe. In a similar vein, Model 3 reports a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for Industry Fragmentation. In line with Hypothesis 1b, 
the results indicate industry fragmentation is associated with the number of online 
marketplaces servicing it, in that the need to search for technologies across numerous firms is 
associated with the emergence of online marketplaces. In Model 4, both search cost variables 
are entered simultaneously and remain significant. To interpret the effect sizes of the relevant 
estimated coefficients, we estimate the response marginal effect of our variables of interest 
keeping all other variables at the mean values (Table 5). First, we predict the number of 
online marketplaces covered for Geographic Dispersion. The results indicate that when 
Geographic Dispersion increases by one standard deviation from its mean, Industry 
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Coverage increases by 51% (an extra 1.3 online marketplace covering the industry). In a 
similar vein, a change of one standard deviation around the mean of Industry Fragmentation 
increases Industry Coverage by 48%.  
 
--------------Insert TABLE 5 about here. -------------- 
 
Next, we test the predictions regarding knowledge ambiguity (Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 
2c) through Models 5–9. We have complete data for 116 industries. Model 5 introduces 
Multifactor Productivity, which proxies for ambiguity due to the rapid technological change 
and multiple trajectories. The coefficient is positive but not statistically significant and the 
marginal effect Multifactor Productivity with a change of one standard deviation around its 
mean only shows an increase of 4% in industry coverage (Table 5). These findings suggest no 
support for Hypothesis 2a.  
We introduce the second ambiguity variable, Industry Linkages, which captures the 
ambiguity regarding possible applications for technologies within an industry. Model 6 
demonstrates that the coefficient of Industry Linkages is significant and positive. Finally, 
Model 7 highlights that Forecast Dispersion, our direct proxy for knowledge ambiguity by 
experts covering the industry, is positive and highly statistically significant, consistent with 
Hypothesis 2c. Model 8 shows that Industry Linkages and Forecast Dispersion continue to 
have a positive and significant effect on Industry Coverage when all prior independent 
variables are controlled for. The marginal effects of Industry Linkages and Forecast 
Dispersion are also meaningful. A change of one standard deviation from the mean of 
Forecast Dispersion increases Industry Coverage by 25% (about one extra online 
marketplace covers the industry) and a change of one standard deviation from the mean of 
Industry Linkages increases Industry Coverage by 23%.  
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Finally, we investigate the impact of an industry’s appropriation regime. Because 
CMU survey data are not available for all 4-digit NAICS codes, the analysis is run on a 
subsample of 101 industries. Model 9 reports the effect of CMU Patenting, our proxy for the 
IPR regime in a given industry. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that industries where patent protection is strong are served by more online markets. 
The result is consistent with the view that strong IP protection (e.g., patents) induces firms to 
participate in a technology marketplace and reveal their technologies because they face a 
lower risk of imitation. The marginal effect for CMU Patenting is also meaningful. A change 
of one standard deviation of CMU Patenting from the mean increases the number of online 
marketplaces serving the focal industry by 27%. Model 10 includes a full specification with 
all independent variables. We find results very consistent with our prior findings.15  
 
--------------Insert TABLE 6 about here. -------------- 
 
4.2. Robustness tests  
We conducted several checks to establish the robustness of our findings.  First, we 
focused on the industrial manufacturing sector where technological innovation may be most 
important, and where the bulk of the data sits. Specifically, Model 11 in Table 5 replicates 
our analysis for the manufacturing sector (83 industries in total) and shows effects very 
similar to the results in the main analysis. We further examined whether our results are 
sensitive to industries with few publicly active firms. Limiting our sample to industries with 
at least 15 or more firms in the Compustat/IBES database continued to support our results.  
4.3. Supplemental analysis: listed technological inventions 
Next, we used an alternative dependent variable for our analysis focusing on the 
actual listings or posting by technology sellers on the online marketplaces. We used various 
                                                            
15
 Only Industry Fragmentation has a slightly weaker effect in this model (coefficient 4.39 at p<0.11). Using the 
dispersion based on sales and not R&D expenses yields similar results and continues to support our predictions.  
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Internet archives (e.g., Waybackmachine, Google Search) to retrieve a snapshot in 2008 or 
2009 as to how many technologies were listed on an online market in a given industry 
category. This approach goes beyond examining which industries online markets serve and 
captures the number of active technology listings on an online marketplace for a given 
industry. For three marketplaces (iBridgenetwork, Pharmatransfer, and Pharmalicensing), we 
were unable to retrieve an exact snapshot between 2008 and 2009, which limits our analysis 
to nine marketplaces.16 Given the strong heterogeneity in the numbers of technologies listed 
on each marketplace, we conducted the analysis on the industry market level so that, for 
example, our initial sample is 1,332 (9 marketplaces times 148 industries minus a few 
industries with missing data). We include market fixed effects in the analysis. Table 6 shows 
the regression results when our analysis is replicated using the number of listed inventions in 
an industry on a marketplace as dependent variable.17 Models 12–22 in Table 7 replicate our 
analysis from Table 6 using technologies listed in an industry on each marketplace as a 
dependent variable. The results are very similar to the main results reported in Table 6, 
reaffirming our general conclusions with respect to the support of the hypotheses.   
-----Insert TABLE 7 about here----- 
4.4. Qualitative insights– Online markets for technology  
To further investigate the role of online marketplaces, we asked each marketplace for 
information regarding transactions that ultimately materialize through the help of their 
markets. We received responses from seven marketplaces in 2015 and 2016 and conducted 
four follow-up interviews to determine whether the listing of an invention ultimately leads to 
realized transactions between sellers and buyers of technology. All responding marketplaces 
                                                            
16
 We took the earliest possible comprehensive snapshot between 2008 and 2009. 
17
 A disadvantage of this approach is that the counts reported through our analysis likely inflate the number of 
technologies listed because we aggregate the marketplace on the 4-digit NAICS code level and some categories 
may be classified to the same NAICS code.  Since we are simply interested in which industries are ultimately 
covered by an online marketplace, we report only the results examining the number of listings as supplemental 
analysis. 
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emphasized that the disclosure of realized transactions is not necessarily in the interest of the 
market participants and, hence, is very challenging to track. For example, one interviewee 
(Tynax) indicated that “there is not much data published about patent transactions, because it 
is usually done under non disclosure agreements with all parties, including the broker. 
Therefore, limited information can be disclosed.” In a similar vein, it was revealed that “both 
inventors and licensors rarely disclose information and [very few] details regarding deal flow 
and values are available.” An important reason for the secrecy was revealed in an interview 
with Ideaconnection, which highlighted that when searching for patents, licensees “do not 
want other firms to know about their search. This is why they use the services of the 
marketplaces in the first place.” Other important reasons to conceal realized transactions 
included concerns that the pricing details of a transaction could adversely affect subsequent 
negotiations about the underlying technology or the reluctance of licensees to reveal a change 
in their strategy (through the acquisition of a patent). A concern of licensors was that 
engaging in a licensing deal fosters speculations regarding the financial health of the licensor. 
Indeed, patent sales in many cases (as, for example, by Kodak in 2012 and Nortel 2011) are 
often associated with poor financial conditions on the part of the companies. 
Finally, many marketplaces emphasized that the online marketplace is only a starting 
point in deal-making between sellers and buyers: “Buying and selling patents takes a long 
time… [as] there is a lot of due diligence done on a patent before it is bought…. Ultimately, 
buying and selling patents requires a lot of offline brokering. The platform is a starting point 
and a marketing tool. It attracts buyers and starts a discussion between buyers and sellers.” 
This observation corroborates research on markets for technology and confirms that 
deals may only materialize after a substantial number of interactions between the parties and 
that, in some cases, these interactions need to happen even after deals have been 
consummated (Arora, 1996). In summary, all responding marketplaces emphasized that deals 
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materialize with the help of the marketplaces, while at the same time they acknowledged 
obstacles and limitations in ultimately tracking such realized transactions. Hence, online 
marketplaces for technology are best characterized as an extension to the market for the 
technology process, in which sellers and buyers need to become aware of each other and 
communicate effectively, but in which transactions are ultimately consumed offline. 
5. Discussion  
The rise of online marketplaces is an important phenomenon, as economic exchange 
increasingly happens online (Amit & Zott, 2001; Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2009). 
Specifically, we investigate online technology marketplaces as a recently arrived institution 
in the market for technology. The popularity of such marketplaces has increased among firms 
(Agrawal et al., 2015b), and we examine whether it is equally strong across the different 
industries. Specifically, we study which industries are served by online marketplaces. Our 
conjecture is that online marketplaces serve prospective sellers and buyers in those settings 
where recognizing each other, and communicating effectively, is a difficult task.  
We find that through their reach, codification, and aggregation, online markets may 
alleviate important frictions in the market for technology. These frictions include search costs 
and knowledge ambiguity about the underlying characteristics of the inventions when 
compared to other emerging technological trajectories, as well as the technology’s potential 
application paths. At the same time, we outline how these features also make online markets 
for technology more prone to the risk of expropriation, so that they most likely serve 
industries that enjoy strong protection of intellectual property. More broadly, our findings 
illuminate the unique role of information technology in shaping the listing of, search for, and 
identification of technologies online, and showcase a novel path through which technology 
buyers and sellers may connect in the market for technology.  
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While our interest is predominantly phenomenological, studying online marketplaces 
also allows us to expand the general understanding of markets for technology. Namely, 
through the use of online markets, we can go beyond the much-studied high-technology 
industries (e.g., semiconductors, biotechnology, or telecommunications) and consider 
differences across a wider array of industries. Our qualitative insights reveal that online 
marketplaces play a particularly important role in the market for technology during the initial 
step, where prospective sellers and buyers initially identify each other. Subsequent stages in 
the market for technology, such as negotiations and deal-making between the participants 
(Agrawal et al., 2015b), may still happen offline. These insights suggest a complementary 
role of online markets for technology for existing technology transactions. 
The study has a number of limitations, which provide ample opportunities for future 
research. First, we observed the industries online markets serve by studying the listing of 
technologies and the industries with which they are affiliated. However, we have no data 
regarding which transactions ultimately occur within each of those marketplaces. We have 
provided qualitative evidence from the marketplace to better understand why we may not be 
able to systematically observe realized transactions. As in prior research  (Hagiu & Yoffie, 
2013), the marketplaces indicated that actual deals, even if originated through an online 
market, may still be consummated offline in a bilateral agreement between a buyer and a 
seller. Therefore, the mechanisms studied facilitate the listing of, search for, and 
identification of technological inventions but do not address the actual execution of deals 
(e.g., through licensing) or the outcomes associated with them, such as the learning between 
the partners or commercialization success. Future research could extend our study by 
exploring the inventions that are ultimately exchanged and the intermediating role online 
marketplaces play in concluding successful deals. In a similar vein, future research should 
also explore the extent to which online marketplaces effectively facilitate the listing and 
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search for technological inventions, and, hence, connect potential technology sellers (e.g., 
inventors) and prospective technology buyers (e.g., licensees). Such a study may need to go 
beyond examining specific industries to look at the potential for drawing linkages between 
industries and how firms may re-deploy technologies in new industries (applications), which 
could lead to a rapid expansion of the market for ideas (Dushnitsky & Klueter, 2016). 
Second, our study offers the opportunity for replication with finer-grained proxies. 
The current set of variables builds on publicly available data and is therefore limited to public 
firms in the 148 industries in our sample. It includes information from over 24,000 public 
firms located in 96 countries. However, we recognize that these firms represent only a subset 
of all firms that might (or already do) participate in online technology marketplaces. Future 
studies should employ more fine-grained industry proxies for industry search costs. In a 
similar vein, it would be important to consider alternative ways to capture knowledge 
ambiguity. For example, our non-finding for multifactor productivity may simply reflect the 
need for a measure that more precisely identifies productivity improvements due to multiple 
new technological trajectories versus incremental improvements along a single pre-
determined trajectory. 
Another important line of extension is for researchers to more precisely explain to 
what extent online marketplaces for technology differ from offline markets for technology. 
Answering this question would require a more explicit explanation of how online markets 
may facilitate the consummation of deals that could not happen offline (e.g., by linking a 
technology to a previously unknown application). Such studies should also elaborate on our 
qualitative insights into how online markets precede bilateral (offline) negotiations and 
consummation of deals (potentially offline). Researchers should also pay attention to what 
type of potential online markets for technology cater to. Following our theoretical arguments, 
it is easy to imagine that connections in online markets may stem from an increase in activity 
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between existing sellers and buyers (e.g., owing to reduced search costs). Alternatively, new 
connections may also come through links with previously unexplored industries or from 
previously uninvolved partners in the innovation value chain (e.g., as ambiguity regarding the 
technology’s features is reduced). Investigating both types of connections and the role of 
online market places in expanding them could be an important way to refine the study for 
future research.  
6.  Conclusion  
The literature presently offers rich evidence regarding existing institutions in selected 
industries (Arora et al., 2001; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Howells, 2006), usually those within 
a narrow subset of high-technology sectors (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999; Sahaym, Steensma, & 
Barden, 2010; Zhang & Li, 2010). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to 
investigate whether this new institution – online technology marketplaces – manifests in 
broad cross-industry coverage.  
Our analysis pivots on three salient theoretical factors – search costs, knowledge 
ambiguity, and possible expropriation – that are known to affect the market for technology 
and vary across industries.  It reveals that marketplaces are more likely to serve an industry 
with (a) higher costs of searching for technologies in that industry, (b) greater levels of 
ambiguity characterizing technological inventions and their potential applications, and (c) a 
greater ability to protect inventions from expropriation. The findings are consistent with the 
idea that the unique features of online markets (i.e., reach, codification, and aggregation) 
address the aforementioned frictions inherent to the market for technology. Hence, our 
findings advance the understanding of online technology marketplaces in particular and 
markets for technology in general.    
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Table 1  
The unique features and implications of online marketplaces. 
Key Argument Supporting Anecdote Related Work 
H1a & 1b: Reduced costs of search. 
Online marketplaces enable (a) speedy search of 
potential parties, and are (b) easily scalable to 
include a large number of previously neglected 
parties domestically as well as across the globe. 
“The problem that people have 
when looking for technology is 
they can’t spend hours . . . IP 
exchanges that offer attractive 
search tools for the user . . . are 
more likely to attract potential 
licensees”(Tactics, 2008). 
“We use yet2.com to help find 
licensees that we wouldn’t 
normally know how to get to.” 
Online platforms facilitate speedy 
access to external parties (e.g. 
Afuah & Tucci, 2012). 
Online platform facilitate access 
to previously neglected parties 
(e.g., Brynjolfsson, Hu, & 
Simester, 2011; Brynjolfsson, Hu, 
& Smith, 2006).   
H2a & 2b & 2c: Reduced ambiguity 
regarding the underlying technological 
knowledge and its possible applications. 
Participation in an online marketplace requires 
(a) codification of the features of the focal 
technology, as well as (b) articulating its 
functionality and potential applications. 
Moreover, (c)  the features and functionality of 
each and every technology are reported using a 
marketplace’s standardized platforms which (d) 
facilitates comparisons across technologies, 
hence supporting identification and valuation of 
the focal technology and making linkages to 
alternative applications for the technology. 
“Because patent abstracts are 
designed to protect an idea from 
infringement, they obscure the 
technology, making it difficult for 
potential buyers to imagine 
relevant applications. Conversely, 
yet2.com features functional 
abstracts written in plain English to 
communicate the potential 
applications and benefits of the 
technology.” 
“But it's quite unlike process 
licensing, where we know who the 
potential customers are. It requires 
a very different marketing 
approach. Often  …  potential 
customers are from industries we 
would never normally have 
considered."  
Outsiders find it difficult to 
observe the features of a 
technology developed by another 
firm. Codification of technology’s 
features enables outsides to 
understand its functionality, 
especially as it goes beyond 
current firm-specific applications 
(Brews & Tucci, 2004; Zollo & 
Winter, 2002; Conti et al., 2013; 
Danneels, 2007). 
Online markets aggregate 
information in a standardized 
manner across a large number of 
technology listings (Evans & 
Wurster, 1999). Aggregated 
standardized information enables 
comparison and benchmarking, 
which is instrumental in 
facilitating assessment of new 
technologies (Grégoire & 
Shepherd, 2012).  
H3: Increase risk of expropriation. 
The fact a marketplace requires codification of 
focal technology’s features may facilitate 
imitation. The concern is exacerbated by the fact 
that the listing is publically posted online. 
Importantly, the concern is uniquely different 
from the common bilateral interactions that take 
place offline; party A discloses technology to 
party B, and can to monitor whether B has 
proceeded to imitate it. In contrast, when party 
A posts its technology online, it has (a) little 
knowledge of who inspected it, and (b) limited 
ability to monitor whether each and every one of 
them proceeded to imitate the technology.  
“[T]echnology descriptions listed 
in our database become part of the 
public domain. Only you can 
determine what you are willing to 
disclose to the public about your 
technology” (yet2.com, 2008). 
“There should not be any 
disclosures that would allow 
someone to misappropriate your 
idea. If you have such concerns . . . 
you might want to consider 
[whether to] reveal your product or 
business idea in full detail” 
(RaiseCapital.com, 2008). 
Disclosure of a focal technology 
feature is necessary to attract 
prospective buyers or licensers, 
but can also result in imitation 
(Arrow, 1962). The legal regime 
of intellectual protection varies 
across industries (e.g., Teece, 
1986; Levin et al., 1987), and 
that, in turn, affects parties’ 
willingness to participate in the 
market for technology (e.g., 
Anand & Khanna, 2000; 
Giarratana & Mariani (2014). 
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Table 2:  Online technology marketplaces (2008–2009). 
Online Market 
Website 
Founded 
Country 
Focus 
Description of Online Marketplaces (2008–2009)a 
Sources: Websites and press releases found on marketplace websites (2008–2009) 
Inventions 
Listers 
(2008-09) 
Market- 
place 2016 
Flintbox 
www.flintbox.com 
2004 
Canada 
Universities 
Flintbox provides a . . . platform for both research and industry to connect and 
build relationships. It is implemented at over fifty universities, government labs, 
and other research organizations (originated by University of British Columbia). It 
allows “direct access to innovation with a network of members and users from over 
one hundred countries around the world.”  
Inv: >3000 
List: >50 
active 
(acquired by 
Wellspring) 
iBridgenetwork 
www.iBridgenetwork.com 
2005 
US 
Universities 
A clearinghouse for innovation, featuring unique research materials posted by the 
participating universities and helping to facilitate the transfer of innovations.  “Our 
objective is to drive transparency and access to university developed innovations 
that are available today as well as to field experts, ideas and information … 
researchers and those seeking innovations can easily search for and obtain the 
resources they need.”  
Inv: >5000 
List: >100 
active 
(acquired by 
Innovation 
Accelerator 
Foundation) 
Ideaconnection 
www.ideaconnection.com 
2007 
US 
Broad 
Ideaconnection is an idea exchange to post and view inventions, innovations, new 
products and patents. Predominantly it is used to share or sell ideas. Entrepreneurs 
can view and buy innovative business ideas, inventions, and solutions.   
Inv: >2000 
List: - 
active 
(Focus on 
Tech Needs) 
Inngot 
www.inngot.com 
2007 
UK 
Broad 
Inngot is a patent listing and IP valuation service platform. “We think companies 
should be out there on the front foot utilising every asset they have, rather than 
leaving their knowledge and capabilities undiscovered, under-utilised and 
unvalued… [the marketplace] provides a consistent starting point for discussions"  
(Brassell, Inngot CEO). 
Inv:  ≈500 
List: - 
Active 
(Focus on 
Valuation) 
Ocean Tomo 
www.icapoceantomo.com 
2005 
US 
Broad 
Marketplace facilitates networking opportunities to support Ocean Tomo Auction 
and Conference.  A forum to facilitate the open and public exchange of intellectual 
property.  
Inv: ≈100 
List: - 
inactive 
online 
market 
Patentauction 
www.patentauction.com 
2004 
Belgium 
Broad 
Patent Auction.com is an online marketplace for innovative ideas protected by 
patent rights. The broad range of inventions for sale or license touches upon all 
fields of industry.… can freely browse through our entire database…. If you have 
questions…you can contact the inventor directly through this website.  
Inv: >400 
List: - active 
 41 
Patentcafe  
www.patentcafe.com and 
http://www.2xfr.com/  
2004 
US 
Broad 
2XFR is PatentCafe's technology licensing exchange where licensees find 
appropriate technologies using a powerful "business terminology" taxonomy. 
2XFR is the only technology transfer website where licensable technology is listed 
by manufacturing process, engineering risk and targeted market segment.  
Inv: >200 
List: -  inactive  
Pharmalicensing 
www.pharmalicensing.com 
2001 
US 
Broad 
Is the leading online global resource for open innovation, partnering, licensing and 
business development within the life science and biopharmaceutical industry… 
complements and enhances business development activity throughout the deal 
making process, from finding partners to making the deal. The marketplace allows 
promotion of business development activities to the global healthcare partnering 
community 
Inv: >1000 
List: 
active 
(acquired by 
Utek then 
TechEx)  
Pharma-Transfer 
www.pharma-transfer.com 
2006 
US 
Broad 
Published nearly 20,000 unique opportunities from over 2,500 organisations 
spanning 100 countries. Pharma-Transfer creates a structured abstract that allows 
concise assessment and evaluation. Subscribers are corporate business developers, 
licensing executives or researchers.  
Inv: - 
List: - 
active 
(acquired by 
Utek then  
TechEx)   
Taeus 
www.taeus.com 
2004 
US 
Broad 
A free, self-service web portal for direct marketing and licensing of intellectual 
property (IP) … allows IP holders to list their technologies, bundle them into 
portfolios, manage their offerings, and monitor viewing statistics, at no charge.  
Buyers can browse and analyze patents and portfolios. Fortune 500 companies, 
universities, IP brokers, and other portals with their own websites can integrate 
with the TAEUS Patent Exchange. 
Inv: >200 
List: - 
active (but 
inactive  
Online 
market)  
Tynax 
www.tynax.com 
2003 
US 
Broad 
Tynax operates a global online technology trading exchange currently featuring 
thousands of patents and technology assets for sale [to] provide unique, full-service 
brokering capabilities to buyers, sellers and other intermediaries. Tynax has a 
highly efficient process for matching buyers with sellers, connecting clients with 
potential partners.  
Inv: >1000  
(visible) 
List: - 
active 
yet2 
www.yet2.com 
2000 
US 
Broad 
yet2.com is focused on bringing buyers and sellers of technologies together so that 
all parties maximize the return on their investments. yet2.com offers companies and 
individuals the tools and expertise to acquire, sell, license, and leverage some of the 
world's most valuable intellectual assets. 
Inv: >3000 
List: >100 
active 
(Focus on 
Tech Needs) 
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Table 3:  Top and bottom industry coverage in manufacturing industries. 
NAICS Online 
Market 
Coverage 
Geogr. 
Disper-
sion 
Frag-
men- 
tation 
Market 
Factor 
Product. 
Industry 
Linkages. 
Forecast 
Disper-
sion 
CMU 
Patent 
NAICS Description 
3254 Top + + - + + + Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing 
3256 Top - + + - - + Soap, Cleaning Compound, and Toilet Preparation Manufacturing 
3331 Top + + + - - + Agriculture, Construction, and Mining Machinery Manufacturing 
3333 Top - + - + + + Commercial and Service Industry Machinery Manufacturing 
3336 Top + + - - + + Engine, Turbine, and Power Transmission Equipment Manu. 
3341 Top + + + - + + Computer and Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing 
3342 Top + + + + + + Communications Equipment Manufacturing 
3345 Top + + + + - + Navigational, Measuring, Electromedical, and Cont. Inst. Manu.  
3346 Top + + + + + - Manufacturing and Reproducing Magnetic and Optical Media 
3391 Top + + + + - + Medical Equipment and Supplies Manufacturing 
3113 Bottom + + + - - - Sugar and Confectionery Product Manufacturing 
3116 Bottom - + + - - - Animal Slaughtering and Processing 
3119 Bottom - + + + - - Other Food Manufacturing 
3161 Bottom + - - - - + Leather and Hide Tanning and Finishing 
3162 Bottom - + - - - + Footwear Manufacturing 
3211 Bottom - - - + + + Sawmills and Wood Preservation 
3315 Bottom + - - + + - Foundries 
3326 Bottom - - - - - + Spring and Wire Product Manufacturing 
3369 Bottom + + - + - + Other Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 
3372 Bottom - + - + - + Office Furniture (including Fixtures) Manufacturing 
+ indicates value above the mean, - indicates value below the mean of the respective variable. 
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Table 4: Summary statistics and correlation table. 
   n-148 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Industry Coverage 1.00                       
2 High Technology 0.53 1.00                     
3 R&D Intensity  0.57 0.61 1.00                   
4 Number of Firms 0.58 0.41 0.62 1.00                 
5 Return on Assets -0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.06 1.00               
6 SG&A Intensity  0.22 0.11 0.44 0.27 0.36 1.00             
7 Geographic Dispersion 0.32 0.01 0.03 0.34 -0.12 -0.19 1.00           
8 Industry Fragmentation 0.45 0.22 0.32 0.46 0.11 0.08 0.41 1.00         
9 Multifactor Productivity 0.13 0.10 0.17 0.16 -0.07 0.03 0.04 0.08 1.00       
10 Industry Linkages 0.12 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.07 -0.13 1.00     
11 Forecast Dispersion 0.22 -0.07 0.00 0.05 -0.53 -0.31 0.22 0.03 0.05 0.05 1.00   
12 CMU Patenting 0.43 0.34 0.30 0.15 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.26 -0.09 0.24 0.03 1.00 
  Mean 3.22 0.26 0.01 1.39 0.04 0.16 0.61 0.95 1.34 0.41 0.79 29.34 
  Standard Deviation 2.99 0.44 0.02 1.44 0.04 0.10 0.20 0.05 1.74 0.00 0.40 8.84 
  Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.78 -2.07 0.40 0.12 12.08 
  Maximum 12 1.00 0.10 5.56 0.12 0.75 0.89 1.00 5.37 0.42 2.60 44.55 
 
Table 5: Key variables marginal effects.  
Variable 
Predicted Value 
(Industry Coverage)  
Predicted Value (Industry 
Coverage at 1SD Above Mean) 
Marginal 
Effect 1SD  
Geographic Dispersion 2.69 4.06 51% 
Industry Fragmentation 2.42 3.58 48% 
Multifactor Productivity 3.13 3.24 4% 
Industry Linkages 3.06 3.76 23% 
Forecast Dispersion 3.16 3.95 25% 
CMU Patent 3.31 4.20 27% 
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Table 6: Main regression (negative binomial) results - dependent variable: industry coverage. 
DV: Industry Coverage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
  Manuf. 
High Technology 0.16 
(0.17) 
0.11 
(0.15) 
0.17 
(0.15) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
0.30* 
(0.15) 
0.32* 
(0.16) 
0.41* 
(0.16) 
0.41** 
(0.15) 
0.27* 
(0.13) 
0.40** 
(0.14) 
0.36** 
(0.12) 
R&D Intensity  11.62* 
(4.93) 
13.60** 
(4.16) 
9.43* 
(4.47) 
11.67** 
(3.77) 
6.46 
(4.27) 
7.19 
(4.61) 
5.55 
(4.72) 
5.15 
(4.04) 
0.04 
(3.67) 
0.33 
(3.85) 
2.55 
(3.24) 
Number of Firms 0.21** 
(0.05) 
0.11** 
(0.04) 
0.14** 
(0.05) 
0.07+ 
(0.04) 
0.18** 
(0.04) 
0.18** 
(0.04) 
0.17** 
(0.04) 
0.08+ 
(0.04) 
0.19** 
(0.04) 
0.11* 
(0.04) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
Return on Assets 4.05* 
(2.02) 
3.08 
(1.92) 
2.47 
(1.94) 
2.06 
(1.77) 
0.19 
(2.05) 
0.04 
(2.14) 
2.59 
(2.22) 
1.10 
(2.06) 
-2.50 
(2.02) 
-2.54 
(1.95) 
-2.86 
(1.83) 
SG&A Intensity  -1.05 
(1.01) 
-0.34 
(1.00) 
-0.51 
(0.96) 
-0.07 
(0.97) 
-0.20 
(0.99) 
-0.25 
(1.04) 
0.24 
(1.01) 
0.92 
(1.06) 
0.75 
(0.91) 
1.54 
(0.97) 
1.68* 
(0.69) 
Geographic Dispersion 2.26** 
(0.62) 
2.06** 
(0.48) 
1.07* 
(0.47) 
0.94* 
(0.44) 
1.08* 
(0.47) 
Industry Fragmentation 6.99** 
(2.52) 
5.35* 
(2.32) 
5.05* 
(2.44) 
4.39 
(2.61) 
6.15** 
(2.34) 
Multifactor 
Productivity 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
Industry Linkages 32.29** 
(12.27) 
24.34* 
(9.95) 
19.68* 
(9.67) 
22.60** 
(8.30) 
Forecast Dispersion 0.51** 
(0.18) 
0.40** 
(0.15) 
0.30* 
(0.13) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
CMU Patenting 0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
Constant 0.53** 
(0.18) 
-0.94* 
(0.43) 
-6.05** 
(2.28) 
-5.78** 
(2.18) 
0.79** 
(0.16) 
-12.36* 
(4.83) 
0.20 
(0.33) 
-15.14** 
(4.54) 
0.21 
(0.23) 
-12.52** 
(4.74) 
-15.28** 
(3.57) 
Log Likelihood 
-316.78 -300.67 -309.69 -296.00 -251.90 -248.66 -248.22 -234.90 -210.52 -199.41 -159.38 
Observations 
(Industries) 148 148 148 148 116 116 116 116 102 102 83 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, negative binomial regression estimates, robust standard errors in parenthesis 
Table 7: Main regression (negative binomial) results – dependent variable: marketplace listings by industry.  
DV: Number of (12) (13) (14) (15) (17) (18) (16) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
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Listings Manuf. 
High Technology 0.00 
(0.18) 
0.08 
(0.23) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
0.07 
(0.23) 
0.27 
(0.22) 
0.32 
(0.23) 
0.43* 
(0.20) 
0.53* 
(0.25) 
0.19 
(0.18) 
0.51* 
(0.22) 
0.40* 
(0.19) 
R&D Intensity  51.56** 
(6.42) 
52.87** 
(9.66) 
48.89** 
(9.72) 
53.68** 
(11.42) 
41.58** 
(8.34) 
42.28** 
(8.23) 
46.11** 
(10.37) 
43.91** 
(10.98) 
31.27** 
(6.92) 
35.08** 
(7.58) 
44.28** 
(8.71) 
Number of Firms 0.48** 
(0.06) 
0.31** 
(0.05) 
0.34** 
(0.06) 
0.23** 
(0.06) 
0.51** 
(0.05) 
0.50** 
(0.06) 
0.50** 
(0.06) 
0.30** 
(0.05) 
0.47** 
(0.06) 
0.31** 
(0.06) 
0.28** 
(0.08) 
Return on Assets 10.78** 
(2.67) 
11.59** 
(3.08) 
6.38* 
(2.58) 
7.33** 
(2.85) 
3.26 
(2.54) 
1.50 
(2.90) 
8.93* 
(4.45) 
3.52 
(5.22) 
-2.25 
(2.85) 
1.73 
(2.53) 
0.69 
(2.13) 
SG&A Intensity  -1.77 
(1.21) 
-0.39 
(2.12) 
-0.22 
(1.87) 
0.43 
(2.16) 
0.46 
(1.69) 
0.53 
(1.60) 
1.21 
(1.78) 
5.39* 
(2.10) 
0.41 
(1.13) 
5.66** 
(1.90) 
4.26** 
(1.60) 
Geographic Dispersion 3.89** 
(0.98) 
3.31** 
(0.89) 
3.49** 
(0.85) 
3.40** 
(1.05) 
2.85** 
(1.09) 
Industry Fragmentation 15.63** 
(3.85) 
10.84** 
(3.42) 
11.11** 
(3.30) 
11.57** 
(3.35) 
14.02* 
(5.45) 
Multifactor 
Productivity 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
Industry Linkages 34.73** 
(10.78) 
40.32* 
(15.70) 
20.03* 
(9.96) 
15.29 
(9.51) 
Forecast Dispersion 1.06** 
(0.35) 
0.98** 
(0.33) 
1.15** 
(0.34) 
0.83** 
(0.32) 
CMU Patenting 0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.04+ 
(0.02) 
Online Market Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.68* 
(0.27) 
-1.75** 
(0.64) 
-14.04** 
(2.58) 
-11.60** 
(2.51) 
0.71* 
(0.30) 
-13.32** 
(4.55) 
-0.54+ 
(0.32) 
-29.85** 
(7.66) 
-0.29 
(0.47) 
-23.40** 
(6.66) 
-22.59** 
(8.23) 
Log Likelihood 
-2782.21 -2758.22 -2752.41 -2736.04 -2540.09 -2538.47 -2534.49 -2490.22 -2393.96 -2302.03 -2127.37 
Online Market-Industry 
Combinations 1332 1332 1332 1332 1044 1044 1044 1044 918 918 747 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, negative binomial regression estimates, clustered standard errors by markets in parentheses. 
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